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Carriers-Delay in Transpiortation-Sbecial Damages.
I. In order to charge a carrier with such special damages for delay in
transportation, as the rental value of machinery intended for immediate-
use, special notice of the intention must be given at the time of shipment
and not afterwards. 22 S. W. Rep. 76o, reversed.
2. The ordinary measure of damages for delay in transporting goods is
the depreciation suffered, and the rental value of the goods for the time
of the delay; these damages must be specially pleaded and proven. 22
S. W. Rep. 76o, reversed.
THE MIEASURuE op DAMAGES.
I. The ordinary measure of
damages resulting from delay in
the delivery of an article shipped,
is the difference between the value
of the article when due and when
delivered.
2. Damages for the value of the
use or rent of a machine can be
recovered only when the special
purposes of the shipment are made
known to the carrier at the time of
the contract of shipment.
Questions as to the measure of
damages for breaches by a carrier
of contracts of shipment of mer-
chandise, present few novel or
difficult problems. Since, how-
ever, such questions are of daily
occurence, and since the text-
books *with their voluminous
excerpts, refined distinctions and
I Reported in 23 S. W. Rep. 320.
interminable references, rather
confuse than enlighten the reader,
it is believed that a short analysis
of the subject, citing only new or
leading cases, may be of practical
value.
The general doctrine as to the
measure of damages in cases of
contract is summarily bompre-
hended in a few pages of Pothier
on Obligatibns :. (Evans Poth. on
Ob. (Ist Am. Ed.) Vol. I. p. 8o, et
seq.) This summary statement is
referred to in most of the leading
cases and forms, confessedly, the
basis of the entire jurisprudence of
England and America upon the
subject. It is unfortunately too
long for reproduction here; but
its substance is found in Article
1928 of the Louisana Civil Code of
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
x826, known as the "Louisana
Rule," and said in Sedgwick on
the Measure of Damages (Vol. I.
p. 67), to be "the clearest and
most definite rule that can be
framed in'this perplexing matter."
That Article is as follows:
"Where the object of a contract
is anything but the payment of
money, the damages due to the
creditor for its breach are the
amount of the loss he has sustained
and the profit of which he has
been deprived, under the following
exceptions and modifications :"
"i. Where the debtor has been
guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he
is liable only for such 'damages as
-were contemplated or may reason-
ably be supposed to have entered
into the contemplation of the par-
ties at the time of the contract.
It is necessary to separate at
once from the authorities to be
considered, a class of cases com-
patatively few in number, but
exceedingly troublesome. In this
annotation cases will not be con-
sidered where the parties have put
themselves outside of the general
rules, by special notices or special
contracts, and where the decisions
turned entirely upon the sufficiency
of such notices or the proof of such
contracts.
It must be noted, moreover, that
a carrier's contract should be con-
sidered, in respect to damages,
without reference to decisions upon
other kinds of contracts, supposed
to be similar. Without going into
nice distinctions on the subject, it
is enough to say that contracts to
build a boat, to repair machinery, to
return a deposit, and to carry a ship-
ment, differ from one another loto
caelo on the very important point
of implied notice. He who repairs
machinery knows, or should know
its probable use; but a carrier may
take a shaft across the country
without knowing whether it is
intended for a steamship or a
sugarhouse.
As a general rule, the measure of
the carrier's liability is the market
value of the shipment at its desti-
nation, computed at the time when
it should have been delivered, less
transportation charges, with in-
terest.
i. It is an old contention on
behalf of the carrier, which still
occasionally reappears, that the
value when shipped should be the
measure; both on account of a
supposed analogy to insurance, and
because the destination value in-
cludes profits. The leading case on
this point is that of Gillingham v.
Dempsey, 12 S. & R., 183 Penn.
(1824). It cites all the authorities
back to the beginning of the cen-
tury and lays down the rule that
the destination value is the test.
This is now the settled juris-
prudence, and this measure has
been used in all the cases cited
under the different heads below.
Other leading cases are: Spring v.
Haskell, 4 Allen, 112 (1862) ; Dean
v. Vaccaro, 2 Head, 488 Tenn.
(1859).
But the prime cost or shipment
value, plus expenses, is a mode of
reaching the destination value,
which may be used in the absence
of direct proof, to which it yields :
McGregor v. Xilgore, 6 Ohio, 358
(1834); North. Transp. Co. v.
McClary, 66 Ill. 233 (1872); R.
Co. v. Phelps, 46 Ark. 485 (1885);
Rome Rd. v. Sloan, 39 Ga. 636.
- 2. The freight, if unpaid, is, of
course, to be deducted from the
destination market value.
It is obvious that any other rule
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would place the shipper in the
same position as if the contract
had neen performed, without pay-
ment of the consideration: North.
Transp. Co. v. lMcClary, 66 Ill. 233
(1872) ; Atkinson v. Castle Garden,
28 Mo. 124 (1859).
3. The market value is to be com-
puted at the destination. By the
destination is meant the terminus
of the road, and not the final desti-
nation which the shipper may
intend the freight to reach: R. Co.
v. Hale, i S. W. Rep. 62o Tenn.
(1886); Ingledew V. R. Co., 7,
Gray (Mass.), 86; R. Co. v. Rey-
nolds, 8 Kansas, 623 (187); R.
Co. v. Henry, 14 Ill. 156 (1852).
4. Contracts of shippers with the
consignee or- other persons, of
which the carrier is not notified at
.the time of the shipment, are not
to be considered in the calculation
of damages as against the carrier.
In the following cases such
damages were not allowed: Mur-
rell Z'. Pacific Exp. Co., 14 S. W.
Rep. io98 Ark. (189o); Ramish'
v. Kirschbraum, 33 Pac. Rep. 70
Cal. (1893); Scott v. S. S. Co.,
io6 Mass. 468 (187); R. Co. v.
Mudford, 3 S. W. Rep. 814 Ark.
(1887); Harvey v. R. Co., 124
Mass. 421 (1878); Lindley v. R..
Co., 88 N. C. 547 (1883).
In the following case there was
such notice and accordingly such
damages were allowed: Deming v.
R. Co., 48 N. H. 455 (1869).
The English authorities to this
effect are cited and. discussed in
Deming v. R. Co., and Harvey v.
Co., supra; and in Langdoni v.
Robertson, 13 Ontario Reports, 497;
3o A. & E. R. R. Cas. 23.
5. Depreciation in the market,
during delay, is not too remote for
consideration, and forms an element
in the measure of damages.
The leading case to the contrary
was Wibert v. R. Co., x9 Barb.
36 (1854). There was great con-
flict of authorities in New York on
this point for many years, but the
rule was finally settled as above
stated in Ward v. R. Co., 47 N. Y.
29 (1871). In other States the
rule was earlier settled : Cutting v.
R. Co., 13 Allen, 381 (1866);
Sisson v. R. Co., 14 Mich. 489
(1866). The rule is now uniformly
accepted and hundreds of cases
might be cited.
6. But in cases where the ship-
ment is intended for a particular
market day, damages resulting
from delay beyond that day, are
not recoverable unless the carrier
had express, notice, or implied
notice from a custom so general
and well-known as to amount
thereto, that the shipment was
intended for that particular market
day: R. R. Co. v. Lehman, 56
Md. 209 (1881); Hamilton v. R.
Co., 3 S. - E. Rep. 164 North
Carolina (1887). But in R. Co. v.
Case, 23 N. E. Rep. 797 Indiana
(189o), and in Ayres v. R, Co., 43
N. W. Rep. 1122 Wisc. (I889),
such damages seem to have been
given with little, if any, proof of
notice.
7. The loss of profits from an
intended special use of the ship-
ment are -not recoverable, unless
notice as to that use was given'
at time of shipment: Cooper v.
Young, 22 Ga. 269 (1859) ; Had-
ley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341; R.
Co. v. Ragsdale, '46 Miss. 459
(1872); and English cases cited
Harvey v. R. Co., sufira. The
case of R. Co. v. Pritchard, 77
Ga. 412 (1887), often cited as
contra, was really controlled by the
peculiar language of the Georgia
Code, as will be seen on examina-
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tion of the Georgia cases which it
cites as precedents.
8. In cases of refusal or failure
to receive for shipment, the measure
of damages is the difference be-
tweeri the destination value and the
shipment value, less transportation
charges. If the shipper can lessen
the damages by shipping in
another way, he may and should
do so: Grund v. Prendergast, 58
Barb. 216. But not if this action
will increase the damages: Ward's
etc. CO. V. Elkins, 34 Michi. 439
(1876). The shipper may charge
carrier for storage, deterioration,
etc., while pending notice of re-
fusal: R. Co. v. Flannagan, 14 N.
E. Rep. 370 Indiana (1887).
9. In cases of delay and injury
the shipper or consignee cannot
abandon the goods and sue for
their entire value: Hackett v. R.
Co., 35 N. H. 390 (I851); Shaw v.
R. Co., s Rich. (Law), 462 South
Carolina (1852); R. Co. v. Tyson,
46 Miss. 729 (1872) ; Briggs v. R.
Co., 28 Barb. 515 (1858). This is
true except under very extreme
circumstances, amounting practi-
cally to total loss: R. R. Co. v.
Warren, x6 Ill. 502 (1855).
io. The Texas case annotated,
states that the rental value of
machinery intended for use cannot
be recovered without notice given
at the time of shipment of the
intended use.
This is the rule laid down in
R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 46 Miss. 459
(1872), generally considered the
leading case. And the case of
British Col. Saw Mill Co. v. Net-
tleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499, demands
that the carrier should have very
full notice and knowledge.
The case of Priestly v. R. Co., 26
Ill. 205 (186I), is directly contrary
to the current of authorities as well
as to the general principles of the
law. It allows "a fair value for the
use of the machinery " during the
period of the delay, claiming that
this furnishes fair compensation
to the shipper; but no considera-
tion is given to the point that such
damages could not be even approxi-
mately estimated by the carrier at
the time of shipment, without
special information. "A fair ren-
tal" for machinery, after deducting
interest on its value, depreciation
from time and use, and other items,
either disallowed or allowed under
other heads, would be a puzzle for
an expert, even if he were fully
informed as to the facts. It can
hardly be supposed that a carrier
contracts with reference to such
damages and has them in his mind
when he is asked for a rate simply
on a shipment of machinery.
ii. Expenses incurred in looking
afrer goods were allowed in Deming
v. R. Co, 48 N. H. 455 (1869); but
refused in Ingledew v. R.. Co., 7
Gray, 86 Mass. ; R. Co. v. Ken-
nedy, 41 Miss. 671 (1868); Briggs
v. R. Co., 28 Barb. 515 (1858).
When these expenses have actually
resulted in decreasing damages,
they are, of course, allowed: R.
Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 452 (1868).
Such expenses have generally been
so small, comparatively, in amount,
that the courts have devoted very
little time to their consideration.
It may be observed, in conclusion,
that the English and American
cases are in unusual harmony upon
this entire subject; and that
frequent citations in the, decisions,
from the Code Napoleon, the works
of Pothier, and the Corpus Juris
-Civilis, show how far this harmony
is due to the labors of the civilians.
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